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ABSTRACT 
In the present paper we consider several measures  Ior the risk that is present in 
ai1 iiisurance environmeiit. We looi< for clesirable properties for two types of risk 
ineasures, the olies reflectiiig both negative and positive  results, and the inea- 
sures for insolvency risks dealing with aspects of niin, as wel1 as their relatioii 
to the allocation of ecoiioiiiic capita1 to different brisiness liiies or to the differ- 
eiit subcompanies constituting a financial conglomerate. The main probleili for 
both types of measureii~ents  is that the dependence structure that exists betweeii 
tlie different units involved is uilknown. I.  INTRODUCTION 
Botli an iiisuïance premium aiid the price of a finaiicial prod~lct  cail be 
regasded as a ilieasure of the risk involved in the fiiiancial traiisaction 
betweeii the  b~iyer  of tlie product  aiid  tlie  seller in the market. Tlie 
insurance premium os the price as a risk ineasure is expressed in tlie 
riglit  units, liaving the dimension of the traiisaction (money). Iii the 
actuarial literature, insurance premium priiiciples have been  studied 
extensively, see e.g. Biililniaiii (1970), Gerber (1979) aiid Goovaerts 
et al. (1984). The pricing of finaiicial rislts is a key topic in finance, 
see e.g. Gerber and Shiii (l 994)"  111  section TII.  a link between actuar- 
ia1 priciiig (by a premium principle) and finaiicial pricing (by meaiis of 
expectation) is given. It is argued that iii genera1 for risks, the corre- 
sponding insuraiice preiiiium principle (and lieiice also the risk inea- 
sure) cannot he assuiiied to be additive, subadditive or superadditive in 
al1 situations. Indeed, a sihiation in which superadditivity is preferable 
is when a risk 2x  is to be insured. For any risk averse insuser, the pre- 
iniuin for 2x,  and hence the 'risk' associated with this random variable, 
will be strictly more than twice the one for x.  For an econoinic priiici- 
ple, it seeins better to require s~ibadditivity  for independent rislts (inore 
is better and safer because of the law of large iiumbers, and because of 
possible hedging), but this is not the case for dependent risks which 
are a coinmon phenomeiion in an inswance context. Tlie two sihia- 
tions, dependeiit risks oii the one hand and independent risks on the 
other, should be approached in quite different ways. 
11.  DISCUSSION OF DESIRABLE PROPERTIES 
111  what follows, we will develop arguineiits indicating that iinposing 
geiieral axioms valid for al1 risky sit~iations  conflicts with generally 
accepted properties for dealing with particular sets of risks, based on 
what could be called as 'best practice' iules. We  will show that pure 
risk measures  should possess other properties  than ineasures devel- 
oped for solvency purposes. 
Some exaiiiples are examined to support this assertion. 
In earthquake risk inszlrance, it is better (hence a lower price results) 
to imzrre &)o independent risla than two positively  dependent risks (two bziildirigs in the sarwe  area). For inszlring a risk fully,  tthe pre- 
mium shozild be 117or-e  than tivice tlze prernizmz  for  insur.ing on!y half 
of the risk. Tlze exchange of portions  of life por.tjolios between differ- 
ent continents  is an ex3~~11npIe  illz~stratilig  the  irnportauzce of  a geo- 
gl~aphical  spread of   isli lis  (i11  order to n~nkce  them more independent). 
As  a consequente, we see  that imposing szibadditivify for  al/ risls 
(iricluding dependent I-is14  is /zot in line wit11 i.i~lzat  cozild  De  called 
'best  practice '. In Secfion  III we wil1 indicate the daiiger of imposing 
p~*olierties  to al/ risks in a given set. 
Ii-i the frainework of risk iiieasures, it is also clear that percei-itiles 
or related ineasures do not catch the rislcy character ot a risk in  an 
economically sensible way. This simply ineai-is that when the Value 
At Risk (VAR) is used to iiieasure risk, it iiiakes for instance i10  sense 
to coiisider subadditivity. This iiotioi-i arises from tlie contamination 
witli  thc probleili  of supci-visioi~,  whcre  thc  supcr;iisor or  a rating 
ageilcy wants to end up with ai1 upper bound for the integrated risk 
of the sum of several portfolios. In that situatioii it would be ilice to 
have a measure for insolvency risk that can be obtained by adding the 
measures for eacli of the portfolios, or merely an upper bound for it. 
Section V wil1 give one possible ailswer. 
Example 2 
Consider a combined risk  Oayments) distributed unifor~nly  on 0,0.  9 
with probabilip  mass  0.9  and  uniformly  distributed  in  0.9,l  with 
prohability  mass 0.1. The risk is unifor.rn(0,  I),  and the 0.  I  per~centile 
equals 0.9. According to the percentile  criterion at the level 0.1, this 
I-andom variable  is as dungerous  as the one with mass  0.9 in 0,0.9 
unìforrnly  distributed  but  combined  with  an  additional  mass  in 
1000,1000.05 uniformly distributed with total mass 0.05 and an addi- 
tional mass (also z1niformly distr*ibzrted) in 0.9,1 with total mass 0.05. 
So a tail cl-iaracteristic like the VAR  on its own is not a good risk 
measure and is i-iot in  liiie with best practice rules. By using the VAR 
as a criterion, olie iinplicitly  assuines that the distributioi-is that are 
coinpared are of a similar type, for instance a nonna1 distributioii. 
It should be reniarked that the conditional expectation, e.g. above 
the 0.9 percentile, does inake a distinction betweeii the two situations 
in  Example 2. Exainple  1 indicates that serious problems may arise 
froin assuming subadditivity. Clearly, subadditivity is not desirable in case dependence aspects 
of the risks are important. Preiniuiii priilciples satisfying the proper- 
ties  of  (sub-)additivity  were  restricted  to  independent  risks.  Risk 
ineasures should cope wit11  dependencies as wel1 as witli tails. 
A problem not to be confused with tlie probleni of defining a risk 
measure for a set of risks coiisists in the deteimiiiation of a measure 
for insolveiicy risk. Tliis problein originates froiii a very practica1 sit- 
uation where within a fiiiancial conglomerate one wants one figure to 
summarize the risks  of a set of different (possibly)  dependent  sub- 
conlpanies. The sairie problem arises in case we coilsider one fïnan- 
cial andlor iiisuraiice institution with different postfolios os business 
lines. Here tlie fiiial ailil is related but different froiii the aiiil of deter- 
mining  a  risk  measure.  For  each  of  Ihe  separate  subcoinpanies 
(dependent os not) one can derive a measure for the insolvency risk 
based on the relevant statistica1 inaterial that coiiies frorn witliin tlie 
subcoinpany (hence only inarginal statistica1 data are used). Here the 
questioil arises whether the suin of the ineasures of insolvency for the 
individual subcompanies gives an zqper bound  of the risk lileasure 
for the sum of risks  contained  in the  financial  conglomerate.  This 
may resemble the concept of subadditivity but in reality it is not the 
Same. It is a probleni of finding tlie best upper bound for tlie measure 
of insolvency of the suin of risks for which we know a measure of 
insolveiicy for each of the iiidividual coinpanies (iiiarginally). This is 
directly related to the following question: if a financial coiiglomerate 
has a risk based capital available that ainounts to d,  theii liow can one 
distribute this ainouiit in d,  + d, +. . .+ d, = d betweeil the subconipa- 
nies  in  such a way that tlie total  nieasure  of insolveiicy is l<nowii, 
only based on the ineasures of insolvency risk of each of the separate 
coinpanies. Tliis question wil1 be dealt with in Sectioii IV. 
We consider another example indicating the danger of imposing a 
general property for nieasures of insolveiicy risk: 
Consider a unijorm rislc X  irz  tlze interval [9,10] and cor?zpa~e  it ivith 
a rislc Y that is a certuinty risk of 1000. Cleavly Pv[X<Y]=I  hut irz 
X-E[X]  theve miglqt be a risk oj  insolvency, while Y-E[Y] presents  no 
risk at all. 
Hence, a risk measure should incosporate a component reflecting 
the mean of the risk. 111.  INSURANCE PREMIUMS VERSUS  PRICING IN FINANCE 
In  Goovaerts  et  al. (1984) it  is  shown how the  Esscher  transfonn 
einerges froin the utility theory in ineasuring tlie price of a random 
variable. Indeed, one has the followiiig theorein: 
Theorern l 
Assume al1  irzszl;*er has an exponential z~tili@fLlnctiorz  with risk over- 
siorz  a. If 1he  charges a pr*emiu;~z  ofthe foi7~z  E[q(JJX] where q(.) is a 
continuous ijqcreasing filnction  ivith E[p(X)] = l,  his utiliq is maxi- 
mized !f q(x) a e",  i.e. if he mes the Esscher prerniunl priuzciyle  with 
parameter d. 
For a proof of this theorein, we refer to Goovaei-ts et al. (1984). If the 
utility function u is exponential, e.g. u(x)=  l -  e-"" ,  then 
wliich leads to the Esscher transform of the risk X.  If u(x) is qua- 
dratic, hence e.g. z/(x) = ax2 + bx, using the  same arguments we 
gel p(x) a 2ax + b, and E[q(X)] = l gives 
which  is a variailce premium principle  wliere the variance  loading 
paraineter  depends  on the mean risk. This is no  restrictioii if oniy 
rislts with a given expectation are coiisidered. 
It has been argued that the variance premium  principle is point- 
less  because  it  might  be  that  a  larger  risk  (with  probability  1) 
requires a lower premium, (see Kaas et al. (2001), Example 10.4.5). 
But for risks with the Same expectation, the variance  is a reliable 
risk measure. In the sequel, we wil1 often consider normalized risks 
X-E[X].  In that case it iminediately follows that, taking into account 
the dependence structure oile gets the three types of additivity as it should be. See also tlie draft report of the solvency working party of 
the IAA, October 2001. 
We would like to note that if one uses the variance as a iiieasme of 
insolvency, wliich according to utility theory is an adequate measure, 
adding risk measures and iniposiiig risk properties such as subaddi- 
tivity does not make any sense. Indeed if /Y,,  ..., X,, are identically dis- 
tributed with zero iiiean and iioii-degenerate, of which &', .  .  .  ,X,,'  are 
tlie comonotonic versions (haviiig the saine marginal cdf's,  but max- 
imal depeiideiice), theii 
This iiidicates that for coinonotonic rislts, superadditivity seeins to 
be  desirable. As we wil1  explaiii,  additioii of insolvency  nieasures 
makes only sense in relation to the distribiition of econonlic capital. 
In addition additivity is usefùl in  case of the repartition on tlie down 
level of a premiuii? incoiile, determiiied oii tlie top level. 
In discussions  concerning the subadditivity of rislts ineasures the 
arguments used are often far from realistic. Iiideed it is said that addi- 
tivity is the worst that can be obtained in case of standard deviation 
o[X,  +X,] I  o[X,]  + o[X,]  (eqiiality holds only in case of a corre- 
lation +l). This is the argu~inent  used for subadditivity, even though 
the standard deviation preiniuin must be ruled out as a risk measure 
because even though X is smaller than  Y with probability  1, it inight 
happen that  its standard  deviation premium  is larger. The standard 
deviation principle should indeed be used as a risk ineasure only for 
randoiii variables with uiiequal expectations. It is important to note 
the distiiiction betweeii tlie collective premium  E[X]  + aVar[X]  witli 
a = Iln ~1/2u  ,  where E  denotes the ruin probability in an infinite time 
horizon  and u the  initia1 surplus in a ruin process,  (see Buhlinann 
(1985)  or  Kaas  et  al.  (2001),  Chapter  5)),  aiid  the  distribution 
between individual contracts of this preiniuin volume by means of an 
additive  premium  principle.  In  this  context  also  tlie  difference 
between pure risk measures and measures for insolvency risk have to 
be seeil. A risk ineasure  serves the pui-pose of a collective ineasure 
for risk of a surn of risks, while a ineasure of insolvency risk has to 
do with addition of marginal risk measures. 
Meaii value principles rely heavily  o11  mixing distributions, as is 
demonstrated in tlie following theorem: S~qpose  tlzat msociated ~vith  ever31 random variahle X there is n ziiziqzle 
ren1 r~zirnbev p[X],  the risk  mensure, with the follo~~i~ig  properties: 
I.  p[c]  = c  for  cr degener-ate risk c 
2.  X s,  Y  p[X]  5 p[Y] with  sttict  ineqz~ulrty I?olditig  zlnless 
X=,  Y. 
3.  If  p[X]  = p[X1],  Y is n  random vnrinble,  and I  is nn  inde- 
pendent  Betwoulli(t)  random vclriable,  hen  p[IX + (l -  I)Y]  = 
p[IXT+(l  -  I)Y]. 
Then the1.e  is a jìlnction  .f;  continuozrs and strictly  inc~*easing,  szrch 
that 
In this situation the assumption 2) of this theorem results in functions 
f  that  are  strictly  increasing. This inakes  the  resiilt  less  attractive 
for  measurement  of  insolveiicy.  More  attractive  tlien  becoine  the 
assuinptioiis 
E [X]  = E[Y]  and E[(X  -  d)  + ] i; E[(Y -  d)  + ]  b'd 
whicli iiieans that  these is convex  order between X arid  Y,  written 
X r', Y. 
As in Kaas et al. (2001,  Defiiiition 10.6.1) it follows that 
X r(,  Y *  E[(d-  X),]  r E[(d-  Y),]  'dd 
such that in addition unifornily heavier lower tails result. 
It can be proven that  X  si,  Y  if and only if  E[j  (X)]  s E[j  (Y)]  for 
al1 convex fuiictions.f, provided tlie expectations exist. 
An iniporlant special case is the following:  E[X]  r.  X for every 
random  variable  X.  Therefore,  we  have  ~[f  (X)]>  f  [E(x)]  for 
every convex function f (Jensen's inequality). 1  X,  a=,  1  X:  ivhen  X;  is  the comoiiotoiiic version of /y.  J  = 
1, ..., n. 
P7~00f 
(See Kaas et al. ((2001), Tlieorein 10.6.4)). 
Tliis result  is in line wit11  a  'best  practice'  approach. Indeed, for a 
pure risk measure the conionotonic suin is the 'inost daiigerous' sum. 
The suin of random variables with an arbitrary dependence sti-uchire 
is less dangerous than the suin of the most dependent variables. This 
is because in the comonotonic versions of the raiidom variables, al1 
possibilities of hedging have been eliminated. 
In addition, for ineasures  of insolvency risk we have that the fatter 
the tails are, the higher the risk ineasure. It remains a open question 
how to define addition of ineasures. A characterization wil1 be given 
in the last paragraph. 
IV.  THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF  IMPOSING  GENERAL  PROPER- 
TIES FOR ALL RISKS 
Let us recall the properties leadiiig to Wang's class of premium prin- 
ciple~,  (see Wang et nl. (1997)). 
Property  1 
For any two risks (non-negative random variables) X and Y we have 
that F,y  (x)  r F,  (x)  for al1 x  > O iinplies p[X]  r  p[Y]. 
Property 2 
If risks Xand Y are comonotonic, then we have p[X+Y]  = p[X]  + p[Y]. 
If X is the degenerate risk which  equals 1 with probability  1, then 
p[X]=  l. Property  1 caii be wealteiied to: if X I  Y with probability olie, tlien 
p[X]  I  p[Y].  (See Kaas et al. (2001), Reinark  10.2.4). Properties 2-3 
imply that p[~l~Y+b]  = a/)[X/tb.  We  recall tlie following leinnia: 
Ass~llne  tbzat  a risk measure hns the properties  1-3. Then ther-e exists 
ar1  zrriiqwe  distortion fi~ucfion  g,  ~tihich  is  non-ci'ecreasing and has 
g(O)=O and g(l)=/,  szrch fhai  for  al1 discrete rrs1r.s  Xwith or~ly~finrtely 
many rnass points,  we have  &X]  =s  g (I -  F, (x))&  . 
We  give a rather simpler proof than Wang et al. Consider a discrete 
distributioii whicli assigns probability p,  to x,  for j=l, ...,  n. For the 
inverse distribution functioii one has 
Next we consider tlie ho-point inverse distributioii: 
Hence, if U is a uniform randoin variable, we have 
Froni Propei-ty 1-2 it is clear tliat for a ho-point risk X with Pr[X = 
n]  = q and Pr[X = O] = l-q,  we have pJX]  = av(q) where \)(q)  is a dis- 
tortioil functioii. 011 the other hand tlie right liand side of tlie above 
equality i11  distribution gives: 
This coinpletes the proof. 
Next let us additionally require additivity of the rislt ineasures (insur- 
ance preiniunis) for sunis of independent risks. If the rislts X and I'  are independent, tlleii we have p/X+ Y]  = p/X] + 
P/Y/. 
In case properties  1-4 hold, the risk measure reduces to the expecta- 
tion. 
Considel two indepericlent risks X and V with Pr[X=l j = l -  Pr[X=Oj 
=y  aiid Pr[Y=l] = 1 -  Pr[Y=O] = q. It is easy to show that for instance 
p[X+Y]  = g@+q-pq)  + +()q).  Property 4 tlien implies: 
Taking the derivative with respect top  gives: 
Next let p -+  û,  then we get g  '(O)  = g '(q)(l-q)  + g '(O)q,  and Iience g '(q) 
=  g'(0).  This, togetlier with g(l)=l, iinplies g(q) = q for al1 q. This proves 
m 
the stated result, since as is well-luiown,  E[X]  = J[l  -F,  (x)]dx  . 
O 
V.  SOLVENCY RISK MEASURES 
Here the probleiîî is coinpletely different fsom the problem  oC  risk 
ineasures. We  have the situatioii tliat one cornpany (os portfolio) A 
has to be considered einbedded int0 n-l  other companies (or portfo- 
lios). In case the coilipany A  is embedded into n-l  very  dangerous 
companies  with  a very liigli solvency  risk  ineasure, the  individual 
risk ii~easure  does nol coiitribute to tlie Same degree to tlie total sol- 
vency requirements  as  in  the  case where  A  is  einbedded  iilto n-l 
other coinpanies having almost no solvency requireinents  calculated 
on individual basis. It might be that enibedding one coinpany into a 
set of n-l  other companies will  disturb the solvency requireineiits, 
because the global solvency requireinents are the constraint. We  will foriiulate the problem as follows by  means of ai1 optimization prob- 
lem. 
Assume that tlie total solvency risk of a conglomerate X, + X,  t..  .+  X,, 
with n subcompanies is ~neasured  by E((X, +  X,  +. .  .X,,  -  d),),  where in 
principle al1 depeildencies are possible. The total risk based capital d, + 
d2 +...+ d,,  has  to  be  distributed  ainong  the  daughter  companies. 
Company i has a solvency risk also ineasured by a stop-loss premium 
E((X, -  dl)+).  The ith s~ibconlpany  only uses the marginal distributioii of 
the risk variable X,. It is clear that the fcllowing subadditivity property 
holds with probability one (see Kaas et al. (2001), Theorein  10.6.4): 
(X, + .... +X,, -d)+ c;  (Xl -d,)+  2 
where d=d,+d2+ ...+  d,.  Because the leA hand side oniy depends on 
d,,  ...,  d,  through the suin d, one is of course interested in determining 
the risk capital in such a way that 
Problem A: 
O11  the other hand the congloinerate measures the risk by 
Problem B: 
~axE((x,  + X, + ....+ X,, -  d)+  ) 
FEI* 
Here I' is tlie set of random vectors with the Same marginal distribu- 
tions as (X,, X-,. . ., X,,). 
The followiilg theorem  indicates  that  using a stop-loss retention 
determined by a VAR  approach is the optimal solution to deal with 
the problem of solvency ineasurement in coilnection with the alloca- 
tion of econoinic capital. ~17ei.e d, = F\'  (F,,,  t d)), with  W = F\,'  (U)  + .  .. + F\'  (U )  for  some 
z111iforri7  iiarinble U. 
Tlie value ofpr,obleni A is determined in the folloiiiir~g  wny 611 mearils 
of' a Lagrar~ge  nzzll  f &lier: 
Takiiig the derivative with respect to each d, gives that for some coii- 
stailt c: 
F,,  (d,  ) = c =+  d, = F,;,'  (c) 
Because  d = 7  dl 011e  pts d,  = F,,' (F,,(d)). 
I= 
The maxiriiun~  in  the theoreil~  is obtained by ineans of the theory of 
conionotonic risks as is showii e.g. in Kaas et al. ((2001),  Theorein 
10.6.4). 
1. lil case eveiywlsere use is isiade of the stop-loss expression both 
for al1 subcoinpanies  and o11  the congloinerate  level, a safe best 
upper bound is obtaiiied. 
2.  The VAR plays a very important role, because based on the over- 
all level d the level d, is determined by iiieails of tlie VAR. 
3. It is clear tliat direct addition of risk ineasures, without taking tlle 
sum of the characteristics of tlie total portfolio into account for the 
subpoitfolios, is iiot very realistic. 
4.  Supervisory  authorities, liaving only the marginal distributioiis 
as data, can of course calculate the individual risk measures by 
using slop-loss preiniums. This allows  US to compare different 
coinpanies. 
5. Another iilterpretatioii is tl-iat when  a joint  treatnient  of the risk 
coinpensation is possible, in case of spreading tlie risk in different coiiipanies  tlie  sum of tlie  risk for iiisolveiicy  is lasger.  So oile 
should minimize it. 
I11  convex order al1 of the possible choices of convex f~iilctions  v pro- 
vide the saine osdering of risla. In this fraii7ework we would like to char- 
acterize one special choice of v based oii rational allocation of economic 
capital. For tliat purpose we coilsider ai1 exteiided problem A and B. 
Theorem 5 
The only convex,fimcfions v fou  which eqzra1it.y  11olds betweel7 
A = M~~E(IJ((~,  + Xz  + ... + X',, -  U'),)  uv/d 
Xti- 
B =  Min  ZE(~)(X,  -  d,  l+) 
'i,  +  +<I,, =<i , 
are given by  V(X) = B(x)  jou some >O. 
Let us consider a uniform distribution o11 [a,  b]  for X,, i = 1,.  . . ,  n. 
Then F  -' (u) = n + (b -  a)u . Because v is a convex fi~nction,  problein 
,y, 
A  can  be  solved  iinmediately,  (see  Kaas  et  nl.  (2001),  Theoreiil 
10.6.4), giving 
On the other hand, problem B can again be solved by ineails of a 
Lagrange inultiplier, giving  E(vl(X, -  d,  )) = h  for al1 j, 
1  l 
os  -v(a  + (b -  a)~  -  d,  )+ I = h 
b-a  O 
1 
OS - 
b-a  ((b-dl~+kv((a-dl)+%  ,x 
d 
Hence d, = d,  for al1 i andj, and because  d = Z d, one finds  d,  = -. 
The value of problem B then equals  n Hence ,4=B  gives: 
for every choice na I d I  Dn. Taking the derivative on botli sides wit11 
respect to d and working out the integration over zr  gives 
d 
Now  choose  b = -i-  a ,  then v(12u) = ni~(a),  and hence v((n + 1)a) 
n 
-  v(na)  = v(aj. 
Taltitig the derivative with respect to a gives 11'(7~a)  = ~'(a). 
Hence  ,,.(a) = $(n)  = v>(%)  = .  V(.)  , sucli that vl(a)  is a con- 
stant, and theref~re  v(a)  = ap. This proves the stated result. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In  this paper,  we have argued that  inaltiilg use  of convexity  order 
leads to a very attractive inethodology for determiiiing a risk nieasure 
for a cluster of portfolios. As a by-prod~ict,  we Cound a coi~sistent  cri- 
terion  for distributing  the  econornic  capita1 between  subportfolios. 
This  criterion  takes  iilto  account  dependencies  between  the  risla 
associated witli these subportfolios, without having to specify these 
dependencies. 
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